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Abstract
We give an example of a three-person deterministic graphical game that has no Nash equilibrium
in pure stationary strategies. The game has seven positions, four outcomes (a unique cycle and three
terminal positions), and its normal form is of size 2 × 2 × 4 only. Thus, our example strengthens
significantly the one obtained in 2014 by Gurvich and Oudalov; the latter has four players, five terminals,
and a 2 × 4 × 6 × 8 normal form. Furthermore, our example is minimal with respect to the number of
players. Both examples are tight but not Nash-solvable. Such examples were known since 1975, but
they were not related to deterministic graphical games. Moreover, due to the small size of our example,
we can strengthen it further by showing that it has no Nash equilibrium not only in pure but also in
independently mixed strategies, for both Markovian and a priori evaluations.
Keywords: deterministic graphical multi-person game, perfect information, Nash equilibrium, di-
rected cycle, terminal position, pure stationary strategy.
1 Introduction
In 1950, Nash introduced his fundamental concept of equilibrium for n-person games [27, 28]. In this paper
we study the existence of a Nash equilibrium (NE) in pure and in independently mixed stationary strategies
in the so-called deterministic graphical multi-person (DGMP) games. These are n-person positional games
with perfect information, without positions of chance, and with terminal payoffs. Such games are modeled
by a finite directed graph that may have directed cycles. The reader can find definitions and more details in
Section 2.
There are two well-studied classes of DGMP games for which the existence of an NE in pure stationary
strategies is known: two-person zero-sum games and acyclic games. In the former case an NE is called a
saddle point. This case has a long history going back to pioneering works by Zermelo [31], Ko¨nig [21], and
Kalma´r [20]. Further results were obtained in the much more general context of stochastic games, for which
Liggett and Lippman [24] corrected the original proof by Gillette [13] and thus established the existence of a
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saddle point in pure stationary uniformly optimal strategies. The last property means that these strategies
do not depend on the initial position; the corresponding equilibrium is called subgame perfect. The interested
reader may find the necessary definitions and statements in [2, 13,24,29,30].
After 1950, it became natural to ask whether we can extend these existence results to n-person games,
replacing the concept of a saddle point by the more general concept of an NE:
(Q): Does every DGMP game have an NE in pure stationary strategies?
The existence of a subgame perfect NE is out of question. The corresponding examples were obtained
already for the two-person case [1]; see also [3].
For acyclic games Kuhn [22, 23] and Gale [12] suggested the method of backward induction, which
answers question (Q) in the positive providing a subgame perfect NE in pure stationary strategies. However
this method is not applicable when the game contains cycles. The interested reader can find more details
in [2, 11,12,22,23,26].
Note, however, that the same position can appear several times, e.g., in chess. In other words, the
directed graph modeling a DGMP game may have (directed) cycles. Thus, question (Q) remained open
for DGMP games with cycles. A positive answer was conjectured in [7, Conjecture 1], yet, Gurvich and
Oudalov disproved this conjecture in [15, 19] 1, thereby answering (Q) in the negative. Their example has
n = 4 players, p = 5 terminals, a unique cycle, which is of length 5, and the normal form of size 2×4×6×8.
In this paper, we give a much smaller example: the game has only seven positions, n = p = 3, there is
a unique cycle, which is of length 2, and the normal form of size 2 × 2 × 4. The small size of this example
allows us to strengthen the result further by proving that the obtained game has no NE not only in pure
but also in independently mixed strategies, for both a priori and Markovian evaluations.
These two examples represent also an important strengthening of some other examples obtained long
time ago. It easily follows from results of [5, Section 3] that game forms corresponding to DGMP games
have the so-called tightness property, which is closely related to Nash-solvability; see Section 5 for more
details. For the two-person case they are just equivalent; for three players, however, tightness does not imply
Nash-solvability [17, 18] (nor vice versa [18]). Yet, all these old examples do not arise from DGMP games,
while the two new examples do.
Results of [5, 17] imply that our 3-player example is minimal with respect to the number of players. In
other words, for any two-person DGMP game an NE in pure stationary strategies exists not only in the
zero-sum case but in general too. (However, the property of subgame perfectness can only be added in the
first case.)
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the basic concepts, definitions, and notation.
In Section 3 we give our main example, a three-person DGMP game with no NE in pure stationary strategies
(Proposition 1). We strengthen this result further in Section 4 by introducing payoffs such that the obtained
games have no NE not only in pure but also in independently mixed strategies, for both a priori and
Markovian evaluations. The proofs of these two claims are given in Appendix. In Section 5, we show that
our example is minimal with respect to the number of players and compare it with tight but not Nash-solvable
game forms from [17,18]. We conclude the paper with some open ends and conjectures in Section 6.
2 Basic definitions
In 1990, Washburn [30] defined a deterministic graphical (DG) game as a two-person zero-sum positional
game with perfect information, without positions of chance, and with terminal payoffs. We extend this
concept and introduce the notion of a deterministic graphical multi-person (DGMP) game, which may be
not zero-sum, even in the case of two players. Such a game is modeled by a finite directed graph (digraph)
G = (V,E) whose vertices are partitioned into n + 1 subsets, V = V1 ∪ . . . ∪ Vn ∪ VT . A vertex v ∈ Vi is
1One of the authors of [15] refused to co-author paper [19] published in Russia.
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interpreted as a position controlled by player i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n}, while a vertex v ∈ VT = {a1, . . . , ap} is
a terminal position (or just a terminal, for short), which has no outgoing edges. A directed edge (v, v′) is
interpreted as a (legal) move from position v to v′. We also fix an initial position v0 ∈ V \ VT .
A pure stationary strategy of a player i ∈ I is a mapping that assigns a move (v, v′) to each position v ∈ Vi.
This concept was introduced by Kalma´r [20] under the name ‘tactic in the strict sense’ (see [29]). In the
literature on stochastic games and Markovian decision processes such strategies are called ‘pure stationary
strategies’, see, e.g., [25]. The term pure positional strategies is also common in the literature [2,3,6].2 Once
each player i ∈ I chooses a (pure stationary) strategy si, we obtain a collection s = (si | i ∈ I) of strategies,
called a strategy profile. In a DGMP game modeled by a digraph, to define a strategy profile we have to
choose, for each vertex v ∈ V \ VT , a single outgoing arc (v, v′) ∈ E. A strategy profile s can be also viewed
as a subset of the arcs, s ⊆ E. Clearly, in the subgraph Gs = (V, s) corresponding to a strategy profile
s there is a unique walk that begins at the initial vertex v0 and either ends in a terminal or results in a
cycle. In other words, s uniquely defines a play P (s) that begins in v0 and either ends in a terminal a ∈ VT
or forms a “lasso”, that is, consists of a (possibly empty) initial path and a cycle repeated infinitely. This
follows from the assumption that s consists of stationary strategies.
We also assume that all cycles of G are equivalent, that is, they form a unique outcome c of the game.
Thus, the game has q = p + 1 outcomes that form the set A = {a1, . . . , ap, c}. This is in agreement with
Washburn’s [30] assumption that all infinite plays result in zero payoff for every player.
To each pair consisting of a player i ∈ I and outcome a ∈ A we assign a payoff value u(i, a) specifying
the profit of player i if outcome a is realized. The corresponding mapping u : I ×A→ R is called the payoff
function. We will write ui(a) instead of u(i, a).
A DGMP game in positional form is a quadruple (G,D, u, v0), where G = (V,E) is a digraph, D is a
partition V = V1 ∪ . . . ∪ Vn ∪ VT of the set of positions, u : I × A→ R is a payoff function, and v0 ∈ V is a
fixed initial position. The triplet (G,D, v0) is called a DGMP game structure.
Remark 1. Standardly, DGMP games studied in this paper can also be represented by trees. However, in
the presence of cycles such trees are infinite. Thus, using the tree representation would not be convenient.
For a vertex v ∈ V let us denote by d+v its out-degree. Then, player i has
∏
v∈Vi d
+
v many different
strategies. We denote this set of strategies by
Si =
{
sij : j = 1, . . . ,
∏
v∈Vi
d+v
}
.
This way we obtain a game form, that is, a mapping g : S → A, where S = S1 × . . . × Sn is the Cartesian
product of the sets of strategies of players i ∈ I. By this definition, g(s) = c when P (s) is an infinite play
and g(s) = a when P (s) terminates in a ∈ VT . The normal form of a DGMP game (G,D, u, v0) is defined
as the pair (g, u), where g is the game form of the DGMP game structure (G,D, v0) and u : I × A → R is
a payoff function. Let us note that game forms and games in normal form are of independent interest and
the former can be studied without underlying DGMP game structures. It is important to understand that
not every game form is a normal form of a DGMP game structures; for example, the latter must be tight;
see Section 5 for the definition.
Given a game (g, u) in normal form, let us fix a strategy profile s = (si | i ∈ I) ∈ S and a player i0 ∈ I.
Then, we can represent s as (si0 , s−i0), where s−i0 is the collection of strategies in s of the other n−1 players
i ∈ I \ {i0}. We say that player i0 can improve on s if (s)he has a strategy s¯i0 such that
ui0(g((s¯
i0 , s−i0))) > ui0(g((s
i0 , s−i0))).
A strategy profile s is called a Nash equilibrium (an NE) if no player can improve on s. In other words, s is
an NE if no player i ∈ I can profit by replacing his/her strategy si in s by a new strategy s¯i, assuming that
2In almost all sections of this paper, we restrict ourselves and the players to their pure stationary strategies. The history
dependent strategies will not be considered at all, while the mixed ones will only be considered in Section 4. In other sections
words “pure stationary” may be given in parentheses or omitted.
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the other n− 1 players keep their strategies from s unchanged. A game form g is called Nash-solvable (NS)
if for every payoff function u : I ×A→ R the corresponding game (g, u) has an NE.
Note that shifting the payoff of any player by a constant does not change the set of NEs of the game. In
particular, we may assume without loss of generality that mina∈A ui(a) = 0 for all players i ∈ I. Furthermore,
let us also note that, by the above definition, one does not need ties, ui(a) = ui(a
′), to construct NE-free
examples.
3 Main example
We now describe our main example: a three-person DGMP game (G,D, u, v0) in positional form without
an NE in pure stationary strategies. Figure 1(a) shows the corresponding DGMP game structure (G,D, v0),
where the initial position v0 is indicated by the square. The set of outcomes is A = {a1, a2, a3, c}, where, as
usual, c represents the cyclic outcome (the unique infinite play). The payoff function can be any function
u : I × A → R satisfying the inequalities listed in Figure 1(b). The game in normal form is given in
Figure 1(c). It is constructed from the positional form in accordance with the definitions of Section 2.
3
1
2
a12
a2a3
player 3
player 2
c a2 a1 a1
c a2 c a2
(1, 2)
(1, 3)
(2, 3) (2, a2) (2, 3) (2, a2)
a3 a2 a1 a1
a3 a3 a3 a3
(2, 3)
(3, 2)
(3, a3)
player 1
(a) the DGMP game (b) constraints on the
(c) the game in normal formpayoff function ustructure (G,D, v0)
min{u1(a2), u1(c)} > u1(a1) > u1(a3)
u2(a3) > u2(a1) > u2(a2) > u2(c)
min{u3(a1), u3(c)} > u3(a3) > u3(a2)
(2, 2) (2, 2) (2, a1) (2, a1)
(1, 2)
(1, 3)
(2, a2) (2, 3) (2, a2)
(2, 2) (2, 2) (2, a1) (2, a1)
Figure 1: Our main example: an NE-free three-person DGMP game in positional and normal forms.
Proposition 1. The three-person DGMP game in Figure 1 has no NE in pure stationary strategies.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that for every s ∈ S there exists a player i ∈ I and a strategy profile s¯ that
differs from s only in the coordinate i such that ui(g(s¯)) > ui(g(s)).
We can easily verify this using Figure 2; see the caption. For example, the entry corresponding to
s = ((1, 2), ((2, a1), (2, a2)), (3, a3)) is a
2
1, indicating that there exists a strategy profile s¯ that differs from s
only in coordinate 2 and such that u2(g(s¯)) > u2(g(s)) = u2(a1). Indeed, if player 2 replaces the current
strategy ((2, a1), (2, a2)) with ((2, 2), (2, 3)), the obtained strategy profile s¯ = ((1, 2), ((2, 2), (2, 3)), (3, a3))
will result in an improvement, since u2(g(s¯)) = u2(a3) > u2(a1) = u2(g(s)). Note that the outcome g(s) = a3
of the strategy profile s = ((1, 3), ((2, a1), (2, 3)), (3, a3)) has two upper indices, because s can be improved
by each of the two players 1 and 3.
Remark 2. The second and the third strategies of player 2 are dominated by the last one. However, in
general, a dominated strategy could participate in a (pure or mixed) NE. Thus, we cannot simply discard
those two strategies of player 2.
Remark 3. The above example contains a unique cycle, which is of length 2. The game restricted to the
positions of this cycle and terminals a2 and a3 has no subgame perfect NE; see [1,3]. This is not a coincidence:
we remark (without giving a proof) that in any NE-free example with a unique cycle, the restriction of the
game to the positions of this cycle and all positions that can be reached from it (not necessarily in one move),
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c2 a22 a
1
1 a
1
1
c2 a32 c2 a
3
2
player 3
player 2
(1, 2)
(1, 3)
(2, 3) (2, a2) (2, 3) (2, a2)
(2, 3)
(3, 2)
(3, a3)
player 1
(2, 2) (2, 2) (2, a1) (2, a1)
(1, 2)
(1, 3)
(2, a2) (2, 3) (2, a2)
(2, 2) (2, 2) (2, a1) (2, a1)
a33 a
2
2 a
2
1 a
2
1
a33 a
1
3 a
1,3
3 a
1
3
Figure 2: The three-person game depicted in Figure 1 has no NE in pure stationary strategies. To verify
this, we only need to check that from each entry of the table, it is possible to move in one of the three
directions, say, in direction i, to another entry specifying an outcome that is strictly better than the original
one for player i. All such directions (players) are indicated by the upper indices, for each entry.
results in a game with no subgame perfect NE. This idea was the starting point for our computer based search
of NE-free games.
4 NE-freeness in independently mixed strategies
In Section 3 we considered pure strategies; now we turn to mixed ones. Mixed strategies of a player are
standardly defined as probability distributions over the (finite) set of all pure strategies of this player. An
independently mixed strategy of player i ∈ I is a collection of probability distributions, one for each position
v ∈ Vi, on the set of moves (v, v′) from v. Obviously, every independently mixed strategy of player i can be
viewed as a mixed strategy, but not vice versa unless player i controls a unique position.
The notion of an NE is extended in the natural way, by taking into account the expected payoff of the
players; see Appendix A.
In a DGMP game, a play may visit the same position more than once, and we distinguish the following
two evaluations of the game played in fixed independently mixed strategies. The Markovian evaluation
assumes that for every player i and for each position of this player, (s)he randomizes the choice of the move
each time the play comes to this position. In contrast, the a priori evaluation assumes that for every player i
and for each position of this player, the random choice of the move at this position is done only once, before
the play begins, and the obtained move is used whenever the play comes to this position again. Clearly, the
probabilities P(s, a) of an outcome a might differ for these two models. The concept of a priori evaluation
was introduced in 2013 by Boros et al. [4].
We now state two theorems explaining how the result of Proposition 1 can be strengthened to examples
having no NE not only in pure but also in independently mixed strategies, for both Markovian and a priori
evaluations.
In the case of Markovian evaluation, no modification to the example from Figure 1 is needed.
Theorem 1. The three-player DGMP game described in Figure 1 has no NE in independently mixed strate-
gies for the Markovian evaluation.
A proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix B.
For the a priori evaluation, the example from Figure 1 is modified by strengthening the set of constraints
on the payoff function u with a set of more specific constraints.
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Theorem 2. The three-person DGMP game described in Figure 1 has no NE in independently mixed strate-
gies for the a priori evaluation whenever the payoff function u satisfies the following conditions:
u1(a2) > u1(c) > u1(a1) > u1(a3) = 0 , (1)
u2(a3) > u2(a1) > u2(a2) > u2(c) = 0 , (2)
min{u3(a1), u3(c)} > u3(a3) > u3(a2) = 0 , (3)
u2(a3)− u2(a1)
u2(a3)− u2(a2) < 1/2 , (4)
u3(a3)
u3(c)
< 1/2 , (5)
u1(a1)
u1(c)
+
u2(a1)
u2(a3)
< 1 . (6)
A proof of Theorem 2 is given in Appendix C.
For a specific payoff function satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 2 let us consider for instance the
following function:
u1(a2) = 4 > u1(c) = 3 > u1(a1) = 1 > u1(a3) = 0 ,
u2(a3) = 8 > u2(a1) = 5 > u2(a2) = 1 > u2(c) = 0 ,
u3(a1) = 4 > u3(c) = 3 > u3(a3) = 1 > u3(a2) = 0 .
It is straightforward to verify that the given payoff function satisfies the requirements.
5 Nash-solvability versus tightness
Let us look at our main example from a different point of view. In particular, we will explain why it is
minimal with respect to the number of players and discuss an important feature present in this example,
along with the earlier example from [15, 19], that was not present in older examples of tight (the definition
is given below) but not Nash-solvable game forms.
5.1 The two-person case
The next theorem shows that the number n = 3 of players cannot be reduced.
Theorem 3. Every two-person DGMP game has an NE in pure stationary strategies.
A proof of this result can be found in [5, Section 3]; see also [7, p. 1485]. We sketch the proof here in
order to explain the basic relations between Nash solvability.
A two-person game form g is called:
(i) Nash-solvable (NS) if for every payoff function u = (u1, u2) the game (g, u) has an NE (in agreement
with the definition of Nash-solvability of n-person games given in Section 2).
(ii) zero-sum-solvable if for every u = (u1, u2) that satisfies u1(a) + u2(a) = 0 for all a ∈ A the game (g, u)
has an NE.
(iii) ±1-solvable if the corresponding game (g, u) has an NE for every u = (u1, u2) such that u1(a)+u2(a) = 0
for each outcome a ∈ A and both u1 and u2 take only values +1 or −1.
Recall that an NE of a two-person zero-sum game, as in cases (ii) and (iii), is called a saddle point.
Proposition 2. The above three properties of two-person game forms, (i) Nash-solvability, (ii) zero-sum-
solvability, and (iii) ±1-solvability, are equivalent.
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The equivalence of (ii) and (iii) was shown in 1970 by Edmonds and Fulkerson [10], and independently
in [16]. Later (i) was added to the list in [17,18], together with one more important property called tightness.
We recall its definition for the general, n-person, case in the next six paragraphs.
Coalitions, blocks, effectivity function, and tightness. Let g : S =
∏
i∈I S
i → A be an n-person game
form. In the game (voting) theory, I and A standardly denote the sets of players (voters) and outcomes
(candidates), respectively. We assume that mapping g is surjective, g(S) = A, but typically it is not injective,
in other words, different strategy profiles may determine the same outcome. The subsets K ⊆ I and B ⊆ A
are called coalitions and blocks, respectively. A strategy sK = (si | i ∈ K) of a coalition K is defined as a
collection of strategies, one for each coalitionist of K. A pair of strategies sK of coalition K and sI\K of the
complementary coalition I \K uniquely defines a strategy profile s = (sK , sI\K).
We say that a non-empty coalition K is effective for a block B if this coalition has a strategy such that
the resulting outcome is in B for any strategies of the opponents; in other words, if there is a strategy sK
such that for any strategy sI\K for the obtained strategy profile s = (sK , sI\K) we have g(s) ∈ B. We write
E(K,B) = 1 if K is effective for B and E(K,B) = 0 otherwise.
Since g is surjective, by the above definition, we have Eg(I,B) = 0 if and only B = ∅. The value Eg(K,B)
was not yet defined for K = ∅. By convention, we set Eg(∅, B) = 1 if and only if B = A.
The obtained function Eg : 2I×2A = 2I∪A → {0, 1} is called the effectivity function (of the game form g).
By definition, Eg is a Boolean function whose set of variables is the union I ∪A of all players and outcomes.
Note that equalities Eg(K,B) = 1 and Eg(I \K,A\B) = 1 cannot hold simultaneously. Indeed, otherwise
there would exist strategies sK , sI\K and blocks B,A \B such that g(s) ∈ B ∩ (A \B) = ∅, that is, g is not
defined on the strategy profile s = (sK , sI\K). Note that cases K = ∅ and K = I are covered by the above
convention. Thus, Eg(K,B) = 1⇒ Eg(I \K,A \B) = 0.
A game form g is called tight if the inverse implication holds too: Eg(I \K,A \B) = 0⇒ Eg(K,B) = 1,
or equivalently, if Eg(K,B) = 1⇔ Eg(I \K,A \B) = 0 for all pairs K ⊆ I and B ⊆ A, or, in other words, if
Eg is a self-dual Boolean function, see, e.g., [9] for the definition.
It is not difficult to see [17, 18] that for the two-person game forms, tightness is equivalent with ±1-
solvability and, thus, can be added to Proposition 2.
Theorem 4. The following properties of two-person game forms: (i) Nash-solvability, (ii) zero-sum-
solvability, (iii) ±1-solvability, and (iv) tightness, are equivalent.
The following theorem completes the proof sketch of Theorem 3.
Theorem 5. Every game form corresponding to a DGMP game structure is tight.
Proof sketch. Let g : S =
∏
i∈I S
i → A be a game form corresponding to a DGMP game structure (G,D, v0).
To verify that g is tight, we have to check the implication Eg(I \K,A \B) = 0⇒ Eg(K,B) = 1 for all pairs
K ⊆ I and B ⊆ A. But this can be easily reduced to the two-person case, simply by replacing coalitions K
and I \K by players 1 and 2, respectively. Then, we have to verify tightness of the corresponding two-person
game forms for every unordered pair {K, I \ K}. Tightness follows from the above convention whenever
coalition K or I \ K is empty; hance, we can assume that ∅ 6= K 6= I. By Theorem 4, tightness for two-
person game forms is equivalent with ±1-solvability. The fact that every DGMP game form is ±1-solvable
was proved by Boros and Gurvich [5, Section 3]; see also [7, Section 12, p. 1485].
Remark 4. It is essential for the above arguments that all cycles form a unique outcome c of the game.
For another natural case, when each cycle is a separate outcome, a criterion of Nash-solvability was obtained
in [7], for the two-person case.
5.2 The n-person case for n > 2
Although the concepts of tightness and Nash-solvability are defined for any number n of player, for n > 2
they are no longer equivalent. In particular, unlike tightness (see the above proof sketch of Theorem 5),
Nash-solvability of n-person game forms cannot be reduced to the two-person case. Moreover, tightness is
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neither necessary nor sufficient for Nash-solvability. An example of a tight but not Nash-solvable game form
was first given in [17]; see Remark 3 therein. This example has the same number of players, n = 3, and the
same size, 2×2×4, as our main example, but it has only three outcomes. A smallest possible such example,
of size 2 × 2 × 2, was suggested by Andrew Volgin in 2012 (at the time he was a high-school student); see
Figure 3. However, this example has four outcomes.
player 3
player 2
a11 a
3
1
a12 a
1
4
player 1
u1(a2) > u1(a1) > u1(a4)
u2(a1) > u2(a3) > u2(a2), u2(a4) > u2(a2)
u3(a4) > u3(a3) > u3(a1)a11 a
2
3
a22 a
3
3
Figure 3: A 2×2×2 game form that is tight but not Nash-solvable. We use the same notation as in Figures 1
and 2.
Another, fully symmetric example with three players and three outcomes was given in [18] but it is of
larger size, 6× 6× 6; it is reproduced also in [5].
Let us emphasize that none of the above examples represents the normal form of a DGMP game structure,
while the three-person 2 × 4 × 2 game form constructed in the present paper does; furthermore, it is also
tight but not Nash-solvable (by Theorem 5 and Proposition 1, respectively). The same properties hold also
for the larger example due to Gurvich and Oudalov [15,19].
6 Open ends
6.1 The case when c is the worst outcome
By definition, all cycles of the digraph modeling a DGMP game form a unique outcome denoted by c,
hence, such a game has p+ 1 outcomes that form the set A = {a1, . . . , ap, c}. Let us consider the following
assumption and the corresponding reformulation of question (Q):
(C): For every player, outcome c is strictly worse than any of the terminals.
(QC): Does every DGMP game satisfying condition (C) have an NE in pure stationary strategies?
While question (Q) was answered in the negative, question (QC) remains open.
3 In the last section of [5]
it was shown that the answer to (QC) is positive for p = 2. An attempt to extend this result to p = 3 was
made in [8]. However, later the authors found a flaw in the proof and, thus, this case remains open, while
question (Q) remains open for p = 2.
It was conjectured in [7, Conjectures 1 and 2] that (Q) and (QC) have a positive answer. Later, in [14],
the first conjecture was disproved and it was conjectured that second question have a negative answer. We
second this conjecture.
Conjecture 1. There exists a DGMP game satisfying condition (C) and having no NE in pure stationary
strategies.
3Our main example and the example from [15,19] do not satisfy (C).
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Some supporting arguments for this conjecture can be derived from results of [3], as follows. In Table 1
of that paper, several concepts of solvability are summarized. Consider the first four rows of this table. In
even rows condition (C) is assumed, while in odd rows it is not. Thus, this part of the table contains 16
pairs of questions (similar to (Q) and (QC)) and for each pair, condition (C) is required in one of the two
questions but not in the other one. In [3], 30 questions (15 pairs) are answered. Among these 30 answers,
22 are negative and 8 are positive, but interestingly, no answer ever depends on condition (C), that is, in
each of these 15 pairs either both answers are negative, or both are positive; in other words, condition (C)
turns out to be irrelevant in all these cases.
Our pair of questions, (Q) and (QC), form the 16th pair of the table. Our main example along with the
example from [15, 19] answers (Q) in the negative, while (QC) remains open. However, taking the above
observations into account, we second [3, 14] and conjecture that the answer to (QC) is the same as to (Q),
that is, negative. However, the counterexample for (QC) may need to be much larger than our example
for (Q).
Note also that a corresponding example, if there is one, would strengthen simultaneously the main
example of the present paper and of [14]; see Figure 2 and Table 2 therein.
Furthermore, we now explain that a positive answer to Conjecture 1 would imply the following curious
statement: there exists a DGMP game satisfying (C) in which c is the only NE outcome (in spite of the
fact that c is worse than any terminal for each player). In an arbitrary DGMP game a strategy profile (in
particular an NE) is called terminal if the corresponding outcome is a terminal position and cyclic if it is c.
A DGMP game is connected if every position is reachable from the initial one.
Proposition 3. If the answer to question (QC) is negative, then there exists a connected DGMP game that
satisfies (C) and has a (cyclic) NE but no terminal one, although the game has at least one terminal.
The last property is important to rule out trivial terminal-free examples such as a directed cycle.
Proof. Take any connected DGMP game Γ′ that has a cyclic NE s′, for example, one of the two games shown
in Figure 4.
1
12
2
3
3
a2
a3
a1 1
2 3 4
3 4 2 1
a1 a2 a3
Figure 4: Two examples of DGMP games with three terminals V ′T = {a1, a2, a3}. Players are indicated inside
the nodes. In the left we have three players, while in the right example there are four. The shaded nodes
controlled by player 1 are the initial vertices. In both cases, thick lines form strategy profiles resulting in a
cycle. It is easy to verify that the pictured strategy profiles are NE in both cases, regardless of the players’
preferences over the outcomes, that is, even if they all rank c the last.
By our assumption about (QC), there exists an NE-free game Γ
′′ that satisfies condition (C). Without
loss of generality, we may assume that Γ′′ is connected. Furthermore, we may assume that Γ′ and Γ′′ have
disjoint sets of players and positions. Let us identify all terminals of Γ′ into a single vertex v′t, and then
identify v′t with the initial vertex v
′′
0 of Γ
′′; see Figure 5.
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3
1
2
v′′0
Γ′′
Γ′ Γ
Figure 5: A schematic depiction of the construction of Γ.
Clearly, the obtained game Γ, having as its initial vertex the initial vertex v′0 of Γ
′, is connected, since
both games Γ′ and Γ′′ are connected. Furthermore, Γ and Γ′′ have the same set of terminals.
We keep the same preferences for the players I ′′ of Γ′′ as before, while for the players I ′ of Γ′, let us
consider arbitrary preferences over the outcomes of Γ′′ satisfying (C).
First, let us show that there is a cyclic NE in Γ. Recall that s′ is a cyclic NE in Γ′; extend s′ by arbitrary
strategies of the players from I ′′. The obtained strategy profile s in the game Γ is also a cyclic NE. Indeed,
by assumption, no player i′ ∈ I ′ can reach v′t by replacing his/her strategy provided all players of I ′ \ {i′}
keep their strategies in Γ′.
It remains to show that no terminal NE σ can exist in Γ. Indeed, if the play P (σ) reaches a terminal of
Γ then it must pass v′t. Since σ is a terminal NE in Γ, its restriction to Γ
′′ must be a terminal NE in Γ′′.
However, by assumption, Γ′′ is NE-free. This contradiction proves our statement.
6.2 Play-once games
In [5], a game was called play-once if every player controls a unique position. In such a game, the sets of
mixed and independently mixed strategies of each player coincide. The game from our main example is
“almost play-once”, in the sense that only one player controls two positions, while each of the other two
controls only one.
Generally speaking, the Markovian evaluation is much more common that the a priori one in the literature,
with many fruitful applications, see, e.g., [25]. However, for play-once DGMP games, the a priori evaluation
also has its advantage. The existence of an NE in independently mixed strategies for the a priori evaluation
is guaranteed by the classical result of Nash [27,28], while for the Markovian evaluation the question remains
open. Nash’s arguments do not apply in this case, since the expected payoff function, as a function of
probabilities, may be discontinuous. For example, in the game represented in Figures 1 and 6 the probability
of the cyclic outcome is 0 unless γδ = 1, in which case the probability may jump to a strictly positive value.
In contrast, for the a priori evaluation, the cycle may appear with a positive probability if γ and δ are both
positive. In this case the expected payoff is a continuous function of probabilities, hence Nash’s Theorem
applies.
Let us note that a subgame perfect NE in the mixed strategies may fail to exist for a play-once game,
for both Markovian and a priori evaluations, already for a 3-person game satisfying (C) [4, 5].
The existence of an NE in pure strategies in a play-once DGMP game also remains open. However, the
answer is positive if we additionally assume condition (C) [5]. (Interestingly, for general DGMP games the
situation is opposite.)
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6.3 Some other open questions
It is open whether the following very general claims hold:
• If a DGMP game (G,D, u, v0) has no NE in pure stationary strategies then there is no NE in the
independently mixed strategies for a game (G,D,w, v0) with a payoff function w such that ui(a) > ui(b)
if and only if wi(a) > wi(b) for all i ∈ I and a, b ∈ A. The problem is open for both (a) a priori and
(b) Markovian evaluations.
If this claim holds for (a) then, by Nash’s Theorem [27,28], any play-once game has an NE in pure stationary
strategies. The latter is known to be true [5] in case when condition (C) holds. However, (a) cannot be
replaced by (b) in the above arguments.
For the case of two terminals, p = 2, a positive answer to question (QC) was given in [5]. An attempt
to extend this result to p = 3 was made in [8], but later the authors found a flaw in the proof and, thus,
already in this case (QC) remains open.
In the case of two players question (Q) is answered in the positive; see Section 5.1. However, (Q) remains
open for the case of two terminals.
It is also open whether our main example is of smallest possible size (number of positions) and if this
is the case, whether it is the unique smallest one. In particular, it is open whether the constraints on the
payoff function given in Figure 1 describe all NE-free games over the given digraph.
Appendix A: Nash equilibrium in independently mixed strategies
In the “independently mixed” setting, we denote by Si the set of independently mixed strategies of player
i ∈ I; a strategy profile s ∈ S = S1 × . . .× Sn is then a collection of independently mixed strategies, one for
each player. Furthermore, the payoff values ui(a) are given, specifying the profit of player i in case outcome
a is realized, where a can be a terminal or the cyclic outcome. The expected payoff of player i ∈ I is the
function φi : S → R defined as
φi(s) =
∑
a∈A
P(s, a)ui(a) , (7)
where P(s, a) is the probability that outcome a ∈ A is realized in the game, assuming that the players play
according to the independently mixed strategies specified by s ∈ S. A strategy profile s ∈ S is then called a
Nash equilibrium (NE) if for each player i ∈ I and for each strategy profile s¯ that may differ from s only in
one coordinate i, we have φi(s) ≥ φi(s¯).
In the proofs of Theorems 2 and 1 given in the last two subsections of the appendix, we adopt notation
from Figure 6, where each arc (v, v′) is equipped with a number in the interval [0, 1], representing the
probability that the player controlling position v will choose the move (v, v′) in v. For example, for every
α ∈ [0, 1] the pair (α, 1 − α) specifies an (independently) mixed strategy of player 1. Similarly, for every
β ∈ [0, 1] and γ ∈ [0, 1], the 4-tuple (β, 1− β, γ, 1− γ) specifies an independently mixed strategy of player 2,
and for every δ ∈ [0, 1], the pair (δ, 1−δ) specifies an (independently) mixed strategy of player 3. Thus, every
strategy profile s ∈ S corresponds to a unique 4-tuple (α, β, γ, δ) ∈ [0, 1]4. We will assume this notation in
the next two subsections.
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 1
Let (G,D, u, v0) be the three-person DGMP game described in Figure 1. The expected payoffs of the game
are given by formula (7), which involves the outcome probabilities P(s, a) for all s = (α, β, γ, δ) ∈ [0, 1]4 and
all a ∈ A = {a1, a2, a3, c}, see Figure 6.
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α
1− α β
1− β
γ
1− γ
δ
1− δ
a1
a2a3
Figure 6: Parameters α, β, γ, δ specifying the independently mixed strategies of the players.
We claim that the outcome probabilities are the following:
P(α, β, γ, δ, a1) = α(1− β) ,
P(α, β, γ, δ, a2) =
{
(αβ + (1− α)δ) 1−γ1−γδ , if γδ < 1;
0, otherwise ,
P(α, β, γ, δ, a3) =
{
(1− α+ αβγ) 1−δ1−γδ , if γδ < 1;
0, otherwise ,
P(α, β, γ, δ, c) =
{
1− α+ αβ, if γδ = 1;
0, otherwise.
The independently mixed strategies of the players defined by the 4-tuples (α, β, γ, δ) can also be viewed as
the set of transition probabilites in digraph G, creating a Markov chain (see Figure 6). The expected payoffs
are computed according to the limit distribution of this Markov chain. If γδ < 1, then the Markov chain
has three absorbing classes corresponding to the three terminals and the limit probability of the 2-cycle c is
zero. If γδ = 1, then the Markov chain has two absorbing classes, terminal a1 and the 2-cycle c.
Digraph G has a unique walk from the initial position to a1, which is realized with probability α(1− β),
independently of whether γδ < 1 or not; this establishes P(α, β, γ, δ, a1) = α(1 − β). Suppose that γδ < 1.
Let v and w be the two positions controlled by player 2 such that (v, w) ∈ E(G) and let z ∈ V3 be the
unique vertex controlled by player 3. The walks from v0 to a2 can be classified into two types depending
on whether they pass through v or not. If the walk passes through v, then its sequences of edges is of
the form (v0v, vw, (wz, zw)
k, wa2) for some k ≥ 0, and the probability of its occurrence is αβ(γδ)k(1− γ).
Otherwise, it is of the form (v0z, zw, (wz, zw)
k, wa2) for some k ≥ 0, and the probability of its occurrence is
(1− α)δ(γδ)k(1− γ). Summing up these probabilities, we obtain
P(α, β, γ, δ, a2) = (αβ + (1− α)δ)(1− γ) ·
∞∑
k=0
(γδ)k = (αβ + (1− α)δ) 1− γ
1− γδ ,
as claimed. A similar computation yields the claimed formula for the value of P(α, β, γ, δ, a3).
If γδ = 1, then the probability of the occurrence of c equals the probability of reaching a vertex of c from
the initial position, which is clearly (1− α) + (αβ). If the Markov chain reaches the cycle, then it will stay
on it with probability one, hence in this case the limit probability of a2 or a3 is zero.
Suppose for a contradiction that the game has an NE, say s∗ = (α∗, β∗, γ∗, δ∗) ∈ [0, 1]4, in independently
mixed strategies for the Markovian evaluation. We split the proof into six exhaustive cases depending on
the values of α∗, β∗, γ∗, δ∗, and show that each of them leads to a contradiction.
Case 1: γ∗δ∗ = 1.
In this case, there are only two possible outcomes: a1 with probability α
∗(1− β∗) and c with probability
1− α∗ + α∗β∗.
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Suppose that α∗ > 0 and β∗ < 1. Then player 1 would be able to strictly improve his/her expected
payoff from φ1(α∗, β∗, 1, 1) = α∗(1−β∗)u1(a1) + (1−α∗+α∗β∗)u1(c) to φ1(0, β∗, 1, 1) = u1(c), by changing
his/her strategy to α = 0.
3
1
2
2
α∗ > 0 1− β∗
γ∗ = 1
a1
a2a3
3
1
2
2 a1
a2a3
δ∗ = 1
11− α∗ β∗ < 1
1− β∗
β∗ < 1
γ∗ = 1
δ∗ = 1
α = 0
This contradicts the fact that s∗ is an NE and shows that either α∗ = 0 or β∗ = 1. In both cases, player
2 would be able to strictly improve his/her expected payoff from φ2(α∗, β∗, 1, 1) = u2(c) to φ2(α∗, 1, 0, 1) =
u2(a2), by changing his/her strategy to (β, γ) = (1, 0).
3
1
2
2
1− β∗
γ∗ = 1
a1
a2a3
3
1
2
2 a1
a2a3
11 β
∗ β = 1
1
α∗ = 0
δ∗ = 1
α∗ = 0
γ = 0
δ∗ = 1
3
1
2
2 a1
a2a3
β = β∗ = 1
1
3
1
2
2
α∗ a1
a2a3
1− α∗ β∗ = 1
α∗
1− α∗
γ = 0γ∗ = 1
δ∗ = 1 δ∗ = 1
This contradicts the fact that s∗ is an NE and settles Case 1.
Case 2: α∗(1− β∗γ∗)(1− δ∗) + δ∗(1− γ∗) > 0 and δ∗ < 1.
Let us first explain the reason for the conditions of this case. The expected payoff of player 2 is a convex
combination of u2(a1), u2(a2), and u2(a3), that is,
φ2(α∗, β∗, γ∗, δ∗) = λu2(a1) + µu2(a2) + (1− λ− µ)u2(a3) ,
where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 with λ+ µ ≤ 1. The coefficients are given by
λ = P(α∗, β∗, γ∗, δ∗, a1) = α∗(1− β∗) ,
µ = P(α∗, β∗, γ∗, δ∗, a2) = (α∗β∗ + (1− α∗)δ∗) 1− γ
∗
1− γ∗δ∗ .
(8)
Recall that u2(a3) > u2(a1) > u2(a2) and note that coefficients λ and µ are both zero if β
∗ = γ∗ = 1.
Thus, if λ+µ > 0, then player 2 can strictly improve his/her payoff to u2(a3), by changing his/her strategy to
(β, γ) = (1, 1) — provided that also δ∗ < 1, since if δ∗ = 1, then P(α∗, β∗, γ∗, δ∗, a3) = (1−α∗+α∗β∗γ∗)(1−
δ∗) = 0.
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α∗
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γ∗
1− γ∗
δ∗ < 1
1− δ∗
a1
a2a3
3
1
2
2
α∗
1− α∗ β = 1
γ = 1
δ∗ < 1
1− δ∗
a1
a2a3
Furthermore, note that λ+ µ is positive if and only if the scaled quantity (λ+ µ)(1− γ∗δ∗) is positive,
and that
(λ+ µ)(1− γ∗δ∗) = α∗(1− β∗)(1− γ∗δ∗) + (α∗β∗ + (1− α∗)δ∗)(1− γ∗)
= α∗(1− β∗γ∗)(1− δ∗) + δ∗(1− γ∗) ,
where the second equality can be routinely verified by separating the terms into those involving α∗ and the
rest.
Thus, under the assumptions of Case 2, player 2 can strictly improve his/her expected payoff from
φ2(α∗, β∗, γ∗, δ∗) = λu2(a1) + µu2(a2) + (1 − λ− µ)u2(a3) to φ2(α∗, 1, 1, δ∗) = u2(a3), by changing his/her
strategy to (β, γ) = (1, 1). This contradicts the fact that s∗ is an NE and settles Case 2.
Assuming that the conditions of Cases 1 and 2 are not satisfied, that is, γ∗δ∗ < 1 and either δ∗ = 1 or
α∗(1− β∗γ∗)(1− δ∗) + δ∗(1− γ∗) = 0, we split the rest of the proof into four exhaustive cases.
Case 3: β∗γ∗ = 1 and δ∗ < 1.
In this case, player 3 can strictly improve his/her expected payoff from φ3(α∗, 1, 1, δ∗) = u3(a3) to
φ3(α∗, 1, 1, 1) = u3(c), by changing his/her strategy to δ = 1.
3
1
2
2
α∗
1− α∗ β∗ = 1
γ∗ = 1
δ∗ < 1
1− δ∗
a1
a2a3
3
1
2
2
α∗
1− α∗ β∗ = 1
γ∗ = 1
δ = 1
a1
a2a3
This contradicts the fact that s∗ is an NE and settles Case 3.
Case 4: α∗ = 0 and δ∗ = 0.
In this case, we have β∗γ∗ 6= 1, since otherwise s∗ = (0, 1, 1, 0) would be an NE of (G,D, u, v0) in pure
strategies, contradicting Proposition 1. Moreover, as the outcome of the game is a3 with probability one, the
expected payoff of player 1 is u1(a3), the worst possible for him/her. If player 1 changes his/her strategy to
α = 1, then his/her expected outcome would become φ1(1, β∗, γ∗, 0) = λu1(a1)+µu1(a2)+(1−λ−µ)u1(a3),
with λ and µ as given by (8) with α∗ = 1. For α∗ = 1, β∗γ∗ < 1 (which is true as argued above) and
δ∗ = 0, we have α∗(1 − β∗γ∗)(1 − δ∗) + δ∗(1 − γ∗) > 0 and hence λ + µ > 0 (recall Case 2). Thus,
φ1(1, β∗, γ∗, 0) > φ1(0, β∗, γ∗, 0) = u1(a3), hence player 1 can strictly improve his/her expected payoff by
changing his/her strategy to α = 1.
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a1
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1− β∗
β∗
γ∗
1− γ∗
3
1
2
2
1
a1
a2a3
1− β∗
β∗
γ∗
1− γ∗
α = 1α∗ = 0
δ∗ = 0 δ∗ = 0
This contradicts the fact that s∗ is an NE and settles Case 4.
Case 5: γ∗ < 1 and δ∗ = 1.
We split this case into three further subcases depending on the values of α∗ and β∗ (assuming, in all the
subcases, that γ∗ < 1 and δ∗ = 1).
Subcase 5.1: α∗ > 0 and β∗ = 1.
In this case, the outcome of the game is a2 with probability one, hence the expected payoff of player
2 is u2(a2). If player 2 changes his/her strategy to (β, γ) = (0, γ
∗), then his/her expected outcome would
become φ2(α∗, 0, γ∗, 1) = α∗u2(a1) + (1 − α∗)u2(a2), which, since α∗ > 0, is a strict improvement over
φ2(α∗, 1, γ∗, 1) = u2(a2).
3
1
2
2 a1
a2a3
β∗ = 1
γ∗ < 1
1− γ∗
1α
∗ > 0
1− α∗
δ∗ = 1
3
1
2
2 a1
a2a3
γ∗ < 1
1− γ∗
α∗ > 0
1− α∗
δ∗ = 1
β = 0
This contradicts the fact that s∗ is an NE and settles Subcase 5.1.
Subcase 5.2: α∗ > 0 and β∗ < 1.
In this case, the expected payoff of player 1 is φ1(α∗, β∗, γ∗, 1) = α∗(1−β∗)u1(a1)+(1−α∗+α∗β∗)u1(a2),
a convex combination of u1(a1) and u1(a2), with strictly positive coefficient at u1(a1). If player 1 changes
his/her strategy to α = 0, then his/her expected outcome would become φ1(0, β∗, γ∗, 1) = u1(a2), a strict
improvement over φ1(α∗, β∗, γ∗, 1).
3
1
2
2 a1
a2a3
γ∗ < 1
1− γ∗
α∗ > 0
1− α∗
δ∗ = 1
1− β∗
β∗ < 1
3
1
2
2 a1
a2a3
γ∗ < 1
1− γ∗
1
1− β∗
β∗ < 1
δ∗ = 1
α = 0
This contradicts the fact that s∗ is an NE and settles Subcase 5.2.
Subcase 5.3: α∗ = 0.
In this case, player 3 can strictly improve his/her expected payoff from φ3(0, β∗, γ∗, 1) = u3(a2) to
φ3(0, β∗, γ∗, 0) = u3(a3), by changing his/her strategy to δ = 0.
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2 a1
a2a3
γ∗ < 1
1− γ∗
1
δ∗ = 1
1− β∗
β∗ < 1
3
1
2
2 a1
a2a3
γ∗ < 1
1− γ∗
1
1− β∗
β∗ < 1
1
δ = 0
α∗ = 0 α∗ = 0
This contradicts the fact that s∗ is an NE and settles Subcase 5.3 and with it Case 5.
Case 6: α∗ = 0, γ∗ = 1, and δ∗ < 1.
In this case, player 3 can strictly improve his/her expected payoff from φ3(0, β∗, 1, δ∗) = u3(a3) to
φ3(0, β∗, 1, 1) = u3(c), by changing his/her strategy to δ = 1.
3
1
2
2 a1
a2a3
γ∗ = 1
1
δ∗ < 1
1− β∗
β∗
1− δ∗
3
1
2
2 a1
a2a3
γ∗ = 1
1
δ = 1
1− β∗
β∗
α∗ = 0 α∗ = 0
This contradicts the fact that s∗ is an NE and settles Case 6.
It remains to show that Cases 1–6 exhaust all possibilities. Perhaps the easiest way to observe this is
to notice that if none of the assumptions of Cases 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 hold, then Case 2 must hold. Indeed,
assuming that Cases 1 and 5 do not hold, we infer that δ∗ < 1. If in addition that Case 3 does not hold,
then we have β∗γ∗ < 1. If Case 4 fails, then we have α∗ > 0 or δ∗ > 0, and if Case 6 fails, then α∗ > 0
or γ∗ < 1. Together, all these inequalities imply that α∗(1 − β∗γ∗)(1 − δ∗) > 0 or δ∗(1 − γ∗) > 0, which
together with δ∗ < 1 shows that the assumptions of Case 2 hold. This completes the proof.
Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 2
Let (G,D, u, v0) be the three-person DGMP game described in Figure 1 and suppose in addition that
the payoff function u satisfies conditions (1)–(6). Recall that the expected payoffs of the game are given
by formula (7), which involves the outcome probabilities P(s, a) for all s = (α, β, γ, δ) ∈ [0, 1]4 and all
a ∈ A = {a1, a2, a3, c}, see Figure 6.
Analyzing the directed paths from the initial position to each terminal position and to the cycle in G,
we obtain:
P(α, β, γ, δ, a1) = α(1− β) ,
P(α, β, γ, δ, a2) = (αβ + (1− α)δ)(1− γ) ,
P(α, β, γ, δ, a3) = (1− α+ αβγ)(1− δ) ,
P(α, β, γ, δ, c) = (1− α+ αβ)γδ .
Suppose for a contradiction that the game has an NE, say s∗ = (α∗, β∗, γ∗, δ∗) ∈ [0, 1]4, in independently
mixed strategies for the a priori evaluation. Note that
0 < α∗ < 1 =⇒ ∂φ
1
∂α
(α∗, β∗, γ∗, δ∗) = 0 .
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Indeed, if 0 < α∗ < 1, then the definition of an NE implies that α∗ is a local maximum of f1, where
f1 : [0, 1] → R is the restriction of φ1, the expected payoff function of player 1, to β = β∗, γ = γ∗, δ = δ∗.
(That is, for all α ∈ [0, 1], we have f1(α) = φ1(α, β∗, γ∗, δ∗).) Since f1 is a continuously differentiable
function of α ∈ [0, 1], we infer that
df1
dα
(α∗) = 0
or, equivalently,
∂φ1
∂α
(α∗, β∗, γ∗, δ∗) = 0 ,
as claimed.
Similarly, we infer that
α∗ = 0 =⇒ ∂φ
1
∂α
(α∗, β∗, γ∗, δ∗) ≤ 0 ,
where ∂φ
1
∂α (α
∗, β∗, γ∗, δ∗) denotes the right partial derivative of φ1 with respect to α evaluated at
(α∗, β∗, γ∗, δ∗) = (0, β∗, γ∗, δ∗), and
α∗ = 1 =⇒ ∂φ
1
∂α
(α∗, β∗, γ∗, δ∗) ≥ 0 ,
where ∂φ
1
∂α (α
∗, β∗, γ∗, δ∗) denotes the left partial derivative of φ1 with respect to α evaluated at
(α∗, β∗, γ∗, δ∗) = (1, β∗, γ∗, δ∗). We can write these three implications concisely as: α
∗ = 0
0 < α∗ < 1
α∗ = 1
 =⇒ ∂φ1∂α (α∗, β∗, γ∗, δ∗)
 ≤ 0= 0≥ 0
 . (9)
In a similar way, we obtain analogous implications involving values of the other three components of s∗: β
∗ = 0
0 < β∗ < 1
β∗ = 1
 =⇒ ∂φ2∂β (α∗, β∗, γ∗, δ∗)
 ≤ 0= 0≥ 0
 ,
 γ
∗ = 0
0 < γ∗ < 1
γ∗ = 1
 =⇒ ∂φ2∂γ (α∗, β∗, γ∗, δ∗)
 ≤ 0= 0≥ 0
 , δ
∗ = 0
0 < δ∗ < 1
δ∗ = 1
 =⇒ ∂φ3∂δ (α∗, β∗, γ∗, δ∗)
 ≤ 0= 0≥ 0
 .
Since for all i ∈ I and all (α, β, γ, δ) ∈ [0, 1]4 we have
φi(α, β, γ, δ) =
∑
a∈A
P(α, β, γ, δ, a)ui(a) ,
we obtain
∂φ1(α, β, γ, δ)
∂α
=
∑
a∈A
∂P(α, β, γ, δ, a)
∂α
u1(a) (10)
and similar expressions hold for ∂φ
2
∂β ,
∂φ2
∂γ ,
∂φ3
∂δ . Thus, we only need to compute the partial derivatives of the
form ∂P(α,β,γ,δ,a)∂η for all η ∈ {α, β, γ, δ} and all a ∈ A.
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For η = α, we obtain:
∂P(α, β, γ, δ, a1)
∂α
= 1− β , (11)
∂P(α, β, γ, δ, a2)
∂α
= (β − δ)(1− γ) , (12)
∂P(α, β, γ, δ, a3)
∂α
= −(1− βγ)(1− δ) , (13)
∂P(α, β, γ, δ, c)
∂α
= −(1− β)γδ . (14)
For η = β, we obtain:
∂P(α, β, γ, δ, a1)
∂β
= −α ,
∂P(α, β, γ, δ, a2)
∂β
= α(1− γ) ,
∂P(α, β, γ, δ, a3)
∂β
= αγ(1− δ) ,
∂P(α, β, γ, δ, c)
∂β
= αγδ .
For η = γ, we obtain:
∂P(α, β, γ, δ, a1)
∂γ
= 0 ,
∂P(α, β, γ, δ, a2)
∂γ
= −(αβ + (1− α)δ) ,
∂P(α, β, γ, δ, a3)
∂γ
= αβ(1− δ) ,
∂P(α, β, γ, δ, c)
∂γ
= (1− α+ αβ)δ .
For η = δ, we obtain:
∂P(α, β, γ, δ, a1)
∂δ
= 0 ,
∂P(α, β, γ, δ, a2)
∂δ
= (1− α)(1− γ) ,
∂P(α, β, γ, δ, a3)
∂δ
= −(1− α+ αβγ) ,
∂P(α, β, γ, δ, c)
∂δ
= (1− α+ αβ)γ .
Recall that u1(a3) = u2(c) = u3(a2) = 0. Plugging the derivatives given by equations (11)–(14) into (10)
yields, together with implication (9) and the assumption u1(a3) = 0, the following:
(P1)  α
∗ = 0
0 < α∗ < 1
α∗ = 1
 =⇒ (1− β∗)u1(a1) + (β∗ − δ∗)(1− γ∗)u1(a2)− (1− β∗)γ∗δ∗u1(c)
 ≤ 0= 0≥ 0
 .
Similarly, we get:
(P2)  β
∗ = 0
0 < β∗ < 1
β∗ = 1
 =⇒ −α∗u2(a1) + α∗(1− γ∗)u2(a2) + α∗γ∗(1− δ∗)u2(a3)
 ≤ 0= 0≥ 0
 , γ
∗ = 0
0 < γ∗ < 1
γ∗ = 1
 =⇒ −(α∗β∗ + (1− α∗)δ∗)u2(a2) + α∗β∗(1− δ∗)u2(a3)
 ≤ 0= 0≥ 0
 ,
(P3)  δ
∗ = 0
0 < δ∗ < 1
δ∗ = 1
 =⇒ −(1− α∗ + α∗β∗γ∗)u3(a3) + (1− α∗ + α∗β∗)γ∗u3(c)
 ≤ 0= 0≥ 0
 .
Observation 1. If (1− β∗)γ∗δ∗ = 0 and β∗ ≥ δ∗, then either β∗ = 1 and (1− δ∗)(1− γ∗) = 0, or α∗ = 1.
Proof. Suppose that (1−β∗)γ∗δ∗ = 0 and α∗ < 1. By (P1), we have (1−β∗)u1(a1)+(β∗−δ∗)(1−γ∗)u1(a2) ≤
0. Since u1(a1) > 0 and u1(a2) > 0, while 1 − β∗ ≥ 0 and (β∗ − δ∗)(1 − γ∗) ≥ 0, we infer 1 − β∗ = 0 and
(β∗ − δ∗)(1− γ∗) = 0. N
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Observation 2A. If α∗ > 0 and γ∗(1− δ∗) = 0, then β∗ = 0.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that α∗ > 0, γ∗(1− δ∗) = 0, and β∗ > 0. By the first implication in (P2),
we obtain −α∗u2(a1) + α∗(1− γ∗)u2(a2) ≥ 0, which further simplifies to (1− γ∗)u2(a2) ≥ u2(a1), contrary
to the assumption u2(a1) > u2(a2) > 0. N
Observation 2B. If α∗β∗(1− δ∗) = 0, then either α∗β∗ + (1− α∗)δ∗ = 0 or γ∗ = 0.
Proof. Suppose that α∗β∗(1− δ∗) = 0 and γ∗ > 0. By the second implication in (P2), we obtain −(α∗β∗ +
(1 − α∗)δ∗)u2(a2) ≥ 0. Since u2(a2) > 0, this yields α∗β∗ + (1 − α∗)δ∗ ≤ 0. Since both summands are
non-negative, it follows that α∗β∗ + (1− α∗)δ∗ = 0. N
Observation 3A. If (1− α∗ + α∗β∗)γ∗ = 0, then either 1− α∗ + α∗β∗γ∗ = 0 or δ∗ = 0.
Proof. Suppose that (1 − α∗ + α∗β∗)γ∗ = 0 and δ∗ > 0. By (P3), we have −(1 − α∗ + α∗β∗γ∗)u3(a3) ≥ 0.
Since u3(a3) > 0, this implies (1−α∗) +α∗β∗γ∗ ≤ 0. Since both summands are non-negative, it follows that
1− α∗ + α∗β∗γ∗ = 0. N
Observation 3B. If γ∗ = 1, then either 1− α∗ + α∗β∗ = 0 or δ∗ = 1.
Proof. Suppose that γ∗ = 1 and δ∗ < 1. By (P3), we have (1−α∗+α∗β∗)u3(c) ≤ (1−α∗+α∗β∗)u3(a3), or,
equivalently, (1−α∗+α∗β∗)(u3(c)−u3(a3)) ≤ 0. Since u3(c)−u3(a3) > 0, this implies (1−α∗) +α∗β∗ ≤ 0,
and, since both summands are non-negative, that 1− α∗ + α∗β∗ = 0. N
We now prove several claims.
Claim 1. If α∗ > 0 and β∗ > 0, then γ∗ > 1/2.
Proof. Since α∗ > 0 and β∗ > 0, we infer from (P2) that
u2(a1) ≤ (1− γ∗)u2(a2) + γ∗(1− δ∗)u2(a3) .
Moreover, assumption (4) is equivalent to u2(a1) > (u2(a2) +u2(a3))/2. Combining the two inequalities and
separating the terms involving u2(a2) from those involving u2(a3), we obtain
(γ∗ − 1/2)u2(a2) < (γ∗ − γ∗δ∗ − 1/2)u2(a3) ,
which, using the facts that γ∗δ∗ ≥ 0 and u2(a3) > 0, implies
(γ∗ − 1/2)u2(a2) < (γ∗ − 1/2)u2(a3) ,
or, equivalently,
(γ∗ − 1/2)(u2(a3)− u2(a2)) > 0 .
Since u2(a2) < u2(a3), we infer γ
∗ > 1/2, as claimed. N
Claim 2. If δ∗ < 1 and 1− α∗ + α∗β∗γ∗ > 0, then γ∗ < 1/2.
Proof. Since δ∗ < 1 and 1− α∗ + α∗β∗γ∗ > 0, we infer from (P3) that
u3(a3) ≥ (1− α
∗ + α∗β∗)γ∗
1− α∗ + α∗β∗γ∗ · u3(c) . (15)
Furthermore, inequality (5) means that u3(a3) < u3(c)/2. Combining the two inequalities and canceling out
the positive factor u3(c), we obtain
(1− α∗ + α∗β∗)γ∗
1− α∗ + α∗β∗γ∗ < 1/2 ,
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which, using 1− α∗ + α∗β∗γ∗ > 0, simplifies to
2γ∗(1− α∗ + α∗β∗) < 1− α∗ + α∗β∗γ∗ .
Suppose for a contradiction that γ∗ ≥ 1/2. Then 1 − α∗ + α∗β∗ < 1 − α∗ + α∗β∗γ∗, which implies
α∗β∗(1− γ∗) < 0, a contradiction. We conclude that γ∗ < 1/2, as claimed. N
Claim 3. If α∗ > 0, β∗ > 0, and δ∗ < 1, then α∗ = 1 and γ∗ = 0.
Proof. Suppose that α∗ > 0, β∗ > 0, and δ∗ < 1. From Claims 1 and 2 we infer that (1−α∗) +α∗β∗γ∗ ≤ 0.
Since both summands are non-negative, both are in fact zero, that is, α∗ = 1 and β∗γ∗ = 0. Since β∗ > 0,
we obtain γ∗ = 0. N
Claim 4. If β∗ > 0 and 0 < δ∗ < 1, then α∗ = γ∗ = 0.
Proof. Suppose that β∗ > 0 and 0 < δ∗ < 1. If α∗ > 0, then Claim 3 implies that γ∗ = 0, from which we
obtain, using Observation 2A, a contradictory β∗ = 0. Therefore, α∗ = 0. Since α∗β∗+ (1−α∗)δ∗ = δ∗ > 0,
we can now use Observation 2B to infer that γ∗ = 0. N
Claim 5. Either β∗ = 0 or δ∗ ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that β∗ > 0 and 0 < δ∗ < 1. By Claim 4, we obtain α∗ = γ∗ = 0. Since
δ∗ > 0, this contradicts Observation 3A. N
Claim 6. β∗ > 0.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that β∗ = 0. We infer from Observation 2B that (1−α∗)δ∗ = 0 or γ∗ = 0.
Suppose that δ∗ = 0. Then α∗ = 1 by Observation 1. But now, player 2 can strictly improve his/her
expected payoff from φ2(1, 0, γ∗, 0) = u2(a1) to φ2(1, 1, 1, 0) = u2(a3) by changing his/her strategy to
(β, γ) = (1, 1), contrary to the fact that s∗ is an NE.
3
1
2
2
α∗ = 1 1
γ∗
1− γ∗1
a1
a2a3
3
1
2
2
γ = 1
1
a1
a2a3
β = 1β
∗ = 0
δ∗ = 0
α∗ = 1
δ∗ = 0
It follows that δ∗ > 0. Suppose that α∗ < 1. Then (1 − α∗)δ∗ > 0 and hence γ∗ = 0. Since 1 − α∗ +
α∗β∗γ∗ > 0 and δ∗ > 0, this contradicts Observation 3A. We thus have α∗ = 1.
Next, note that we have either u1(a1)u1(c) < δ
∗ or u2(a1)u2(a3) < 1 − δ∗, since otherwise we would have
u1(a1)
u1(c)
+
u2(a1)
u2(a3)
≥ 1, contradicting inequality (6).
Suppose first that u1(a1) < δ
∗u1(c). Then, player 1 can strictly improve his/her expected payoff from
φ1(1, 0, γ∗, δ∗) = u1(a1) to
φ1(0, 0, γ∗, δ∗) = δ∗(1− γ∗)u1(a2) + γ∗δ∗u1(c) > δ∗((1− γ∗)u1(c) + γ∗u1(c)) = δ∗u1(c) > u1(a1) ,
by changing his/her strategy to α = 0.
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31
2
2
α∗ = 1 1
γ∗
1− γ∗1− δ∗
a1
a2a3
3
1
2
2 a1
a2a3
δ∗
1
1
γ∗
1− γ∗1− δ∗
δ∗
β∗ = 0
α = 0
β∗ = 0
This contradicts the fact that s∗ is an NE.
Suppose now that u2(a1) < (1− δ∗)u2(a3). Then, player 2 can strictly improve his/her expected payoff
from φ2(1, 0, γ∗, δ∗) = u2(a1) to φ2(1, 1, 1, δ∗) = (1−δ∗)u2(a3) by changing his/her strategy to (β, γ) = (1, 1).
3
1
2
2
α∗ = 1 1
γ∗
1− γ∗1− δ∗
a1
a2a3
3 2
2 a1
a2a3
δ∗
γ = 1
1− δ∗
δ∗
1 α
∗ = 1
β = 1β∗ = 0
This contradicts the fact that s∗ is an NE and completes the proof of Claim 6. N
Claim 7. 0 < β∗ < 1 and δ∗ ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. The fact that δ∗ ∈ {0, 1} follows from Claims 5 and 6; it thus suffices to show that 0 < β∗ < 1.
Suppose this is not the case. Then β∗ = 1 by Claim 6. Observation 1 implies that either δ∗ = 1, γ∗ = 1, or
α∗ = 1.
Suppose that δ∗ = 1. Then α∗ = 0 by Observation 2A. Furthermore, Observation 2B implies that
γ∗ = 0. Therefore s∗ = (0, 1, 0, 1) is an NE of (G,D, u, v0) in pure strategies, contradicting Proposition 1.
We conclude that δ∗ = 0, which implies, in particular, that γ∗ = 1 or α∗ = 1.
Since β∗ = 1, we have 1−α∗+α∗β∗ = 1 and Observation 3B implies that γ∗ < 1. Therefore, α∗ = 1. But
now, player 2 can strictly improve his/her expected payoff from φ2(1, 1, γ∗, 0) = (1 − γ∗)u2(a2) + γ∗u2(a3)
to φ2(1, 1, 1, 0) = u2(a3) by changing his/her strategy to (β, γ) = (1, 1).
3
1
2
α∗ = 1
γ∗ < 1
1− γ∗1
a1
a2a3
3 2
2 a1
a2a3
γ = 1
1
1
β = β∗ = 1
2
β∗ = 1
δ∗ = 0
α∗ = 1
δ∗ = 0
This contradicts the fact that s∗ is an NE and completes the proof of Claim 7. N
Claim 8. δ∗ = 0.
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Proof. Suppose that δ∗ > 0. Then δ∗ = 1 by Claim 7. By the same claim, β∗ > 0, which implies that
α∗β∗+ (1−α∗)δ∗ > 0, hence Observation 2B yields γ∗ = 0. Next, Observation 3A implies that α∗ = 1. But
this contradicts Observation 2A. N
We now have everything ready to derive the final contradiction, which will complete the proof of Theo-
rem 2. We have 0 < β∗ < 1 and δ∗ = 0 by Claims 7 and 8. From Observation 1, we infer α∗ = 1. This in
turn implies, using Observation 2A, that γ∗ > 0. But now, player 2 can strictly improve his/her expected
payoff from φ2(1, β∗, γ∗, 0) = (1 − β∗)u2(a1) + β∗(1 − γ∗)u2(a2) + β∗γ∗u2(a3) to φ2(1, 1, 1, 0) = u2(a3) by
changing his/her strategy to (β, γ) = (1, 1).
3
1
2
α∗ = 1
γ∗ > 0
1− γ∗1
a1
a2a3
3 2
2 a1
a2a3
1
1
β = 1
2
β∗
1− β∗
δ∗ = 0
γ = 1
δ∗ = 0
α∗ = 1
This contradicts the fact that s∗ is an NE and completes the proof.
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